Dwight Hughes, et al v. Eva M. Cafferty, et al : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
Dwight Hughes, et al v. Eva M. Cafferty, et al : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Evan A. Schmutz; Lance N. Long; Attorney for Appellees.
Charles M. Bennett; Blackburn & Stoll, LC; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Hughes v. Cafferty, No. 2000866 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2549
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DWIGHT HUGHES, et al. 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
EVA M. CAFFERTY, et al 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 20020518-SC 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 2000866-CA 
Civil No. 960400289 
Judge James Taylor 
PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF 
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT AND 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Evan A. Schmutz 
Lance N. Long 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
33 19 North University Avenue 
Provo,UT 84604 
Attorney for Respondent and Appellees, 
Linnea Bennett, Dwight Hughes, and 
John Hughes 
Charles M. Bennett 
Blackburn & Stoll, LC 
77 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Petitioners and Appellants, 
Eva (Rikki) Cafferty and Joseph. Hughes 
f* i * " t p ^ 
U FAN 
p 
•w'LL CL 
"1 
'HOCOMEW 
tz, 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DWIGHT HUGHES, et al 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
EVA M. CAFFERTY, et al 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 20020518-SC 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 2000866-CA 
Civil No. 960400289 
Judge James Taylor 
PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF 
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT AND 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Evan A. Schmutz 
Lance N. Long 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
33 19 North University Avenue 
Provo,UT 84604 
Attorney for Respondent and Appellees, 
Linnea Bennett, Dwight Hughes, and 
John Hughes 
Charles M. Bennett 
Blackburn & Stoll, LC 
77 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Petitioners and Appellants, 
Eva (Rikki) Cafferty and Joseph Hughes 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Standard of Review 
Rikki and Joe Have Properly Sought Certiorari and Have 
Properly Cited the Relevant Facts and Legal Theories in 
Support of their Petition. 
Rikki and Joe Have Used the Facts to Support Their 
Argument; the Appellees Use Unsupported Facts and 
Characterizations. 
The Appellees' Hypocritical Reliance on the March 1993 
Documents and Criticism of the Recovery of $100,000 for the 
Marital Trust. 
The Supreme Court Should State a Rule of Law that Makes 
Sense for Utah. 
There was No "Considered Opinion" of the Trial Court or the 
Court of Appeals Regarding Linnea's Conduct as a Trustee. 
Rikki and Joe Did Not Receive Any Benefit from the Recovered 
Monies in Their Role as Beneficiaries. 
Rikki and Joe Properly Appealed the March 1998 Declaratory 
Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Page No. 
1 
1 
1 
6 
7 
9 
12 
13 
14 
14 
-1-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page No. 
Cases 
Allardv. Pacific National Bank, 663 P.2d 104 (Wash. 1983) 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992) 
DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995) 
Hughes v. Cafferty, 445 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2002 UT App 105,46 P.3d 
233 (Utah 2002) 
In re Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1997) 
State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah, 1995) 
State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1995) 
State v. Weeks, 2002 WL 31246086 (Utah 2002) 
Stewart v. Publ. Serv. Comm., 885 P.2d 759, 782-84 (Utah 1994) 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998) 
9 
1 ] 
6 
3,11 1 
14 1 
2,3 
2,5 
3I 
1, 2, 9, 10, 
11,13 1 
1 1 
Statutes 1 
Utah Code §75-7-405 5 
• i i -
ARGUMENT 
1. Standard of Review. 
Appellees allege that the determination of whether or not to award attorney fees 
under the inherent power is a discretionary decision of the trial court that is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. Appellees' Brief at 1. This may be correct for the 
Third Federal Circuit, as noted mDardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d 125 (3d. Cir. 1999). 
But in Utah, the Court reviews an award of fees pursuant to statute or contract under the 
correction of error standard. Valance v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). 
There would appear to be no policy reason while an award pursuant to the court's 
"inherent power" should be reviewed differently. Stewart v. Publ Serv. Comm., 885 P.2d 
759, 782-84 (Utah 1994) illustrates that attorney fees awarded under the "inherent power" 
are reviewed for correctness. However, the standard of review does not matter in this 
case, in as much as an award of attorney fees to Linnea was an abuse of discretion in any 
event. See Appellants' Brief at 24-41. 
2. Rikki and Joe Have Properly Sought Certiorari and Have Properly Cited the 
Relevant Facts and Legal Theories in Support of their Petition. 
The Appellees have misinterpreted Butterfield v. Okubo and its progeny. 831 P.2d 
97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992). The point of these cases is that, on a petition for certiorari, the 
Supreme Court reviews the challenged part of the Court of Appeals' decision and the trial 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law related thereto. What the Court does not 
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do is conduct a plenary, de novo review of the trial court's decision as if it were the Court 
of Appeals. Thus, in State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1995), this Court stated: 
We first clarify our standard of review. On certiorari, we review the 
decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the trial court. . . . In 
doing so, this court adopts the same standard of review used by the court of 
appeals: questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's 
factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous. . . . The issues 
presented in this case—whether Harmon's arrest was constitutional and 
whether her consent to search was voluntary-are questions of law that we 
review for correctness.... The trial court's underlying factual findings will 
not be set aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. 
(Citations omitted). The Court states the standard for reviewing the factual findings of 
the trial court because those findings are reviewed to the extent the issue on appeal 
requires that review. 
The Court of Appeals erred in applying the Supreme Court's dicta in Stewart v. 
Publ Serv. Cornm., 885 P.2d 759, 782-84 (Utah 1994). If the Supreme Court agrees, then 
it can, if it chooses, establish the correct statement of the rule and remand the case to the 
Court of Appeals for a reconsideration of its ruling. In essence, the Appellees claim that 
the Supreme Court must remand all cases. Appellees' Brief at 18-21. That claim is 
erroneous. The Supreme Court has recognized on multiple occasions that it can and 
should rule on an issue as a matter of judicial economy. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 908 
P.2d 856 (Utah,1995). In Brooks, the Court of Appeals misinterpreted prior court 
decisions and held that it did not need to consider the defendant's argument for reversal 
of his conviction on the basis of "plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel." 
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Rather than remanding to the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled on the matter at 
issue. It held: "[Considerations of judicial economy suggest that we dispose of these 
issues ourselves. We therefore turn to the merits of Brooksf claims of plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 860. 
Similarly, in this case, the Court of Appeals held that the only relevant finding was 
whether a recovery had been made for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust. 
Hughes v. Cafferty, 46 P.3d at f25. Thus, the Court of Appeals here, as in Brooks, 
ignored the other factual issues that it should have considered. Accordingly, Rikki and 
Joe properly asked the Court to set the appropriate rule and to rule on their appeal without 
remand based on the findings of the trial court and other undisputed evidence. 
Appellants' Brief at 41-42. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that, on a certiorari review, it can affirm the 
Court of Appeals' decision "on any legal ground or theory supported by the record." 
State v. Weeks, 2002 WL 31246086 (Utah 2002), ^  10. It is not enough for Rikki and Joe 
to show that the Court of Appeals erred; they must also establish that correcting the error 
makes a difference in the outcome. They must analyze the rule as adopted by the Court of 
Appeals, the correct statement of the rule, and the application of the facts to the correctly 
stated rule. Only then can the Supreme Court review the issue upon which it granted 
certiorari. 
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Where the Supreme Court must consider the factual context, the findings of the 
trial court, and other undisputed facts, the Supreme Court is certainly in a position not 
only to establish the correct rule, but also to apply the rule to the undisputed facts of the 
case. Since this litigation began in May 1996, Rikki and Joe have asked the Supreme 
Court to do this in the interest of judicial economy. 
Likewise, the Appellees incorrectly claim that Rikki and Joe are raising issues for 
the first time in their Appellants' Brief. Appellees' Brief at 21. Rikki and Joe made these 
points at both the trial court level, R. at 1934 et seq., and with the Court of Appeals, 
Appellants' Brief to the Court of Appeals at 20-40. Moreover, having stated that these 
factual issues are irrelevant, the Appellees then state "the court of appeals correctly stated 
the rule . . . and then correctly applied that rule to the facts of this case . . . ." Appellees' 
Brief at 26. Clearly, the Appellees cannot argue that the facts were correctly applied 
without considering what those facts are. Rikki and Joe would suggest that Appellees 
would like the Court to ignore pages 24-41 of their Appellants' Brief because that 
analysis effectively shows that it is inequitable and unjust to award attorney fees to 
Linnea based on the undisputed facts in this case. 
Rikki and Joe do not need the Court to reverse any other portions of the appellate 
court's decision; however, this Court has authority to overrule clearly erroneous rulings of 
the trial court that bear on the issue at hand: Should Linnea Bennett be awarded attorney 
fees in this matter? See Appellants' Brief at 24-41. Even if the Court does not overturn a 
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finding, in order to determine whether or not it is equitable and just to award Linnea 
attorney fees directly from Rikki and Joe, the Court needs to consider the gravity of 
Rikki's and Joe's misconduct. For example, it is relevant to note that the trial court's 
finding that the five children were the proper trustees of the Family Trust from 1979 
forward (R. 1950-48) violates the express provisions of UCA Section 75-7-405.l 
Appellants' Brief at 28-29. It is not necessary for the Court to reverse the trial court's 
finding that all five children were the Trustees of Family Trust from 1979 onward. Rikki 
and Joe simply ask the Court to consider this point in weighing the gravity of their 
misconduct in not recognizing this "fact." Without reversing the trial court's finding, the 
Supreme Court can still rule that Rikki's and Joe's failure to recognize this "fact" was not 
egregious or bad faith misconduct (or misconduct at all). Moreover, as noted by State v. 
Harmon, supra, the Supreme Court can overrule that clearly erroneous finding of fact for 
the limited purpose of weighing Rikki's and Joe's conduct as Trustees. 
The nature of the misconduct is clearly affected by the underlying facts. The trial 
court's holding that the trustees repay the attorney fee paid to Mr. Middaugh to open the 
California conservatorship would have an entirely different tenor if the amount paid had 
been $500,000 rather than $5,000, or if the purpose in hiring the attorney had been to hide 
trust assets for the benefit of Rikki and Joe instead of to recover $100,000 of marital trust 
1
 That section of the Utah Code provides that on the inability of one co-trustee to 
serve, the other co-trustee(s) continue to serve. 
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assets. Appellants' Brief at 34-36. Likewise, the holding that Rikki and Joe repay 
$55,000 in trustee fees would have a different tenor if their hourly rate had been $2,000 
per hour prior to reduction, as opposed to $8.30 per hour. Appellants' Brief at 41. These 
facts are important to any reasoned analysis of the equity and justice of awarding attorney 
fees to Linnea against Rikki and Joe. 
Finally, Appellees claim that Rikki and Joe have raised issues that were not 
addressed in their Petition for Certiorari. Appellees' Brief at 20. This is incorrect. As 
this Court held in DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995), "In granting a petition for 
certiorari, we review f,[o]nly the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included 
therein." Id. at 443. Where the issue is whether it is equitable and just to award attorney 
fees against a trustee in favor of a beneficiary, the Court must examine the conduct of the 
trustee and the beneficiary. While Rikki and Joe believe that the factual issues addressed 
by Rikki and Joe must be reviewed to apply the rule, those factual issues at a minimum 
are "fairly included [ in Rikki's and Joe's Petition for Certiorari]." 
3. Rikki and Joe Have Used the Facts to Support Their Argument; the Appellees 
Use Unsupported Facts and Characterizations. 
In their Appellants' Brief, Rikki and Joe have carefully identified the factual 
findings of the trial court and the undisputed facts, providing citations to the record for all 
of these points. In comparison, the Appellees often make outrageous and false 
characterizations without any citation to the record (because there is no record support). 
Consider their conclusion: "[T]he wrongful conduct of Rikki and Joe . .. constituted 
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oppressive, malicious, and bad faith conduct...." Appellees' Brief at 45. Neither the 
trial court nor the Court of Appeals made any such statement. As carefully explained in 
the Appellants' Brief at 24 through 41, the facts of the case simply do not support any 
such allegation. While many of the misstatements have been identified in this brief, there 
are some that are not. Rikki and Joe simply ask the Court to note when facts and 
characterizations are alleged without citations to the record. The reason for these 
"lapses" {see URAP Rule 24(a)(7) and (e)) is that the record simply does not support the 
factual allegation or characterization. 
4. The Appellees' Hypocritical Reliance on the March 1993 Documents and 
Criticism of the Recovery of $100,000 for the Marital Trust. 
The Appellees criticize Rikki and Joe for refusing to accept the 1993 amendments 
to the Marital and Family Trust. Appellees' Brief at 12-13. This is rank hypocrisy. Not 
one of the affidavits the Contestants executed claimed the right to act as Trustee based on 
the 1993 Trust Amendment. See Exhibits 13, 17, and 18. More importantly, when the 
Contestants sought a declaratory judgment in November 1997 declaring the trustees of the 
trusts, they did not even advise the Court of the 1993 Amendment, much less seek to have 
its terms enforced. R. 1244-48 (Linnea's Motion and Memorandum), R. 1249-53 
(Dwight's), 1254-58 (John's). The reason for this is that they knew their father was 
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incompetent to sign the amendments. T.2912 (Linnea's testimony Mac would sign 
anything put in front of him). 
The Appellees further state, without citation to the record, that "it is unrebutted 
that both Joe and Rikki were aware of Mac's intention to keep the money he and Leora 
had taken from Marital Trust and maintain i t . . . separate from the trusts and the 
beneficiaries." Appellees'Brief at 13. This is absolutely false. Leora took the money. 
T.988, 1003-04. Indeed, Mac signed Exhibit 212, the first contract where Leora agreed to 
return the money to the trust. And only Leora signed the second contract, Exhibit 49, and 
it provided that Leora was to return the money. Exhibit 49. Finally, they claim that "the 
Utah [conservatorship] proceeding reversed the efforts of Joe and Rikki [in the California 
proceedings] and rendered the entire California proceeding a waste of time and trust 
assets." Appellees' Brief at 14. This is true only if you consider the recovery of 
$100,000 in trust assets to be "a waste of time and trust assets." R.1943 (Trial Court's 
finding that Rikki and Joe recovered $100,000 for the Marital Trust). If the Appellees are 
so sure this was a waste of time and money, Rikki and Joe stand ready and willing to 
accept $20,000 from each of them (representing their share of the $100,000 Rikki and Joe 
recovered). 
2
 "T." stands for transcript. It can be found at R.2473 and 2474. 
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5. The Supreme Court Should State a Rule of Law that Makes Sense for Utah. 
Rikki and Joe believe that the authorities cited on pages 22 through 26 and 28-32 
of the Appellees' Brief, properly analyzed {compare Appellants' Brief at 17-22), support 
their contention as to the nature of the rule that should be adopted by Utah. While the 
Appellees are technically correct that no jurisdiction has adopted the Rule as proposed by 
Rikki and Joe, Appellees' Brief at 27, certainly the Washington Supreme Court has 
adopted a rule that is similar in intent. In Allard v. Pacific National Bank, 663 P.2d 104 
(Wash. 1983), the Washington Supreme Court held: "Ordinarily, the trust estate must 
bear the general costs of administration of the trust, including the expenses of necessary 
litigation. . . . Where litigation is necessitated by the inexcusable conduct3 of the trustee, 
however, the trustee individually must pay those expenses." Id. at 112. But, in the final 
analysis, regardless of what other jurisdictions have done (or have not done), the critical 
question for the Court is what makes sense for Utah? 
What the Appellees seem to forget is that the starting point for an analysis of when 
a beneficiary should be awarded attorney fees is the "American Rule." Stewart, 885 P.2d 
at 782. Under the American Rule, absent a statute or contract, no matter the fault of the 
parties, each pays its own fees. Thus, absent an exception, the beneficiary's attorney fees 
would be paid by the beneficiary. The purpose of the "inherent power" exception is to 
insure that justice and equity prevail. Under the Court of Appeals' analysis, the American 
3
 And the Court described that breach as "egregious." Id. at 111. 
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Rule is simply discarded when there is a recovery from a trustee. As a matter of public 
policy, that makes no sense. If a recovery is all that is necessary for an award of attorney 
fees against a trustee, why should it not also apply against any other losing litigant? A car 
driver can be far more negligent and careless, and cause far more damage, than a trustee, 
where both cause losses to others. To award attorney fees to the beneficiary as a matter 
of course without regard to both the conduct of the trustee and the beneficiary means that 
the American Rule is not" the general rule in Utah" in trust litigation between a trustee 
and a beneficiary. Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782. 
The Appellees criticize Rikki and Joe for changing their proposed rule between the 
Petition for Certiorari and their Appellants' Brief. Appellees' Brief at 28-32. There is no 
basis for this criticism. The Supreme Court's statements in Stewart were dicta. The 
Supreme Court did not have to make any analysis of the application of those statements 
since that was not the basis for the Court's decision in Stewart. This case offers the Court 
the opportunity to establish the rule that Utah courts will follow in cases like this in the 
future. Rikki and Joe have modified the proposed rule in their Appellants' Brief only to 
reflect their additional thinking on the point. The proposed rule is only that. The Court is 
free to shape its own rule. Interestingly, the Appellees have offered the Court no 
guidance. 
The Appellees' criticism that Rikki's and Joe's statement of the rule has removed 
any discretion is unwarranted. Appellees' Brief at 28-30. Rikki and Joe believe the 
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statement of the rule indicates that the trial court has discretion within the guidelines 
provided. It expressly reaffirms the "inherent power to award attorney fees to a 
beneficiary who obtains a recovery for the benefit of a fiduciary estate." It contemplates 
that the trial court may or may not determine it is just and equitable to award fees. If the 
trial court awards fees, the rule provides guidelines for determining when the award 
should be charged to the estate and when it should be charged to the fiduciary. 
Appellants' Brief at 23. However, if this needs clarification, the Supreme Court can 
certainly state that the "inherent power" is to be exercised "in the discretion of the trial 
court." Similarly, the criticism that the proposed rule requires the trial court to weigh 
irrelevant facts and circumstances, Appellees' Brief at 29-30, can be cured by adding the 
word "relevant" before "facts and circumstances." 
The Appellees' criticism would have been better directed towards the Court of 
Appeals' decision. It is the Court of Appeals' application of Stewart that is rigid and 
unbending. There is no effort to analyze the relevant facts and circumstances of the case 
to determine if an award is equitable and just. The "only relevant fact" is whether there is 
a recovery. Hughes v. Cafferty, 46 P.3d at ^ [25; see also Id. at ^ 25, n.2. Thus, the 
Appellees' argument concerning Rikki's and Joe's statement of the proposed rule shows 
how improper the Court of Appeals' decision is. 
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6. There was No "Considered Opinion" of the Trial Court or the Court of 
Appeals Regarding Linnea's Conduct as a Trustee. 
The Appellees argue that "[i]n the considered of [sic] opinion of both courts, there 
was no wrongful conduct by Linnea " Appellees' Brief at 31. Further, Appellees 
allege: "The record shows that both courts addressed Linnea's conduct and found that it 
was proper. Hughes at Tfll; (R. 1959,1937-36)."4 Appellees'Brief at 33. RikkiandJoe 
believe that a "considered" opinion would be one that addresses the issue and then 
resolves it. Neither court ever discussed Linnea's behavior as a trustee. Paragraph 11 of 
the Court of Appeals' decision, the trial court's discussion at R. 1959, and the trial court's 
discussion at R. 1937-36 contain no findings regarding Linnea's conduct as a trustee. 
Indeed, there could be no discussion of her conduct as a trustee, followed by any reasoned 
explanation of why, notwithstanding that misconduct, Linnea still should be awarded 
attorney fees. The purpose of the trial was to consider Rikki's and Joe's objections to the 
Final Ballot she approved as trustee (R.1427), and none of the actions Linnea took as a 
trustee in the Final Settlement Ballot formed the basis of the trial court's ultimate 
decision. Compare Exhibit 20 with the trial court's Memorandum Decision, R.1960 et 
4
 The Appellees even cite footnote two of the opinion. Appellees' Brief at 36-37. 
After stating that the "only relevant fact" was whether there was a recovery, in footnote 
two, the Court of Appeals stated: "Accordingly, we need not reach Rikki and Joe's 
challenges to other findings of fact." That hardly supports the Appellees' claim. 
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seq. In terms of an award of fees, Linnea5 s misconduct equaled or exceeded that of Rikki 
and Joe. See generally Appellants' Brief at 24-26. 
7, Rikki and Joe Did Not Receive Any Benefit from the Recovered Monies in 
Their Role as Beneficiaries. 
Contrary to the Appellees' claims,5 Appellees' Brief at 38, the trial court required 
Rikki and Joe to be charged for the excess fees and the Middaugh payment. It is not what 
the trial court said, it is what it did, that matters. The amounts they were charged were 
taken from Rikki's and Joe's distributive share and then paid directly to three of the five 
beneficiaries. R. 1939-38. That means that the Trust was not benefitted.6 Rikki and Joe 
as beneficiaries were harmed by the Trustees' misconduct just as any other beneficiary. 
Linnea has acted in the interest of only three of the five beneficiaries, and at her request, 
Rikki and Joe, in their capacities as beneficiaries, were not allowed to participate in the 
recovery. Whatever Rikki's and Joe's faults as Trustee, no one found them guilty of 
misconduct as a beneficiary. Thus, Linnea has not provided a benefit to the Trust, but 
only to three of the five trust beneficiaries. 
5
 And contrary to the Appellees' own statement earlier in their brief that: "The 
trial court required Rikki and Joe to pay from their distributive share the $5,230 of trust 
funds they had spent on attorney fees . . . ." Appellees' Brief at 14-15. 
6
 Thus, the "common theory" underlying the Stewart decision would not apply. Stewart, 
885 P.2d at 782-84. 
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8. Rikki and Joe Properly Appealed the March 1998 Declaratory Judgment. 
Appellees claim that Rikki and Joe could not appeal the trial court's March 1998 
Declaratory Judgment because they failed to do so within thirty days following the entry 
of the judgment. Appellees' Brief at 42-44. The cases cited for this proposition all 
involve situations were an appeal was taken before an estate was closed, and the appellate 
court, taking a "pragmatic view", held that the appeal was timely because the order 
appealed was final for appeal purposes. In re Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Utah App. 
1997). That does not, however, mean that an appeal that is taken when the order truly 
becomes final after the estate administration is concluded is untimely. Rikki and Joe ask 
the Court to note this point in its opinion in any event. Otherwise, probate litigators will 
appeal every intermediate order because an appellate court may later deem the order final 
as to some important issue in the litigation. The "pragmatic rule" should be applied in a 
pragmatic manner. Id. The March 1998 Declaratory Judgment was timely appealed. See 
Notice of Appeal, R.2278. 
CONCLUSION 
In establishing a rule that gives Utah courts guidance in exercising their "inherent 
power" to award attorney fees to beneficiaries and against the trust estate or the trust, 
Rikki and Joe ask the Court to consider the following factors: 
a. The administration of trusts is becoming more and more complex. A trustee 
may need to deal with income tax issues (IRC §641 et seq.), environmental 
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waste issues (UCA §75-1-109), creditor claims (UCA §75-7-308 etseq.\ 
and a host of other problems that either did not exist for most of the 
twentieth century or existed in a far less complex environment. 
b. Trusts are commonly administered by non-professional family members 
who must depend on the advice of professionals.7 
c. While trustees should be held to a high standard of conduct, they should not 
be penalized by an award of attorney fees to the beneficiaries absent a 
showing of egregious or bad faith misconduct. Otherwise, the rule 
undermines the flexibility and usefulness of trusts in family settings. 
Thus, Rikki and Joe believe that they have suggested a reasonable rule that 
balances the interests of beneficiaries, trustees, and the public policy concerns of this 
state. Rikki and Joe ask the Court to adopt the rule in substantially the form they have 
proposed, to apply that rule to the undisputed facts of this case, to reverse the decisions of 
the Court of Appeals and the trial court, and to order the trial court to enter judgment 
without an award of attorney fees to Linnea Bennett. 
7
 The Court should note that Rikki and Joe were told by attorney Michael Loveridge that 
the 1974 Trust did not appoint the five children beneficiaries of the children's trust (T.814) and, 
indeed, he drafted the Bennett resignation, delegation, and appointment documents (Exhibits 23 
and 25; notary signature); they were told by attorney Doug Morrison that the 1974 Family Trust 
could be restated as part of the 1987 Trust (see Exhibit 2 at 1); they were told by attorney Doug 
Morrison and their father that they would serve as trustees until they were "unable or unwilling to 
serve for any reason" (Exhibit 47); they hired the accountant that Mac had used to do his 
accounting work to prepare the accounting (T.347,892) that the trial court found to be "less than 
useful." R. 1937-36; and they filed the California conservatorship on the advice of counsel 
(T.823-829; see also T.735-737, T.1203) 
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Dated this ^ day of January, 2003. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Charles M. Bennett 
Attorneys for Eva. M. Cafferty and 
Joseph M. Hughes 
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